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LAND RENTAL BY S CORPORATIONS
— by Neil E. Harl*
Since enactment of Subchapter S in 1958,1 attention has
been focused on the type of lease entered into by S
corporations.2  The question has been whether the income
received by the S corporation as lessor constituted "rents"
for purposes of the passive income test.3
Current passive income rule
The pre-1983 limit on passive investment income was
eliminated by the Subchapter S Revision Act of 19824 for
corporations which do not have accumulated earnings and
profits from years the corporation was regularly taxed.5
Thus, corporations without earnings and profits face no
limitations on passive investment income.  Even cash rents
are of no consequence tax-wise and pose no threat to the S
corporation election.
For corporations with accumulated earnings and profits
from years in which the corporation was regularly taxed, a
tax is imposed at the highest rate for corporate income (now
35 percent)6 on the passive investment income in excess of
25 percent of gross receipts.7  A Subchapter S election
terminates, however, if a corporation under a Subchapter S
election has earnings and profits at the close of each of three
consecutive taxable years (from years the corporation was
under regularly taxed or Subchapter C status) and more than
25 percent of the gross receipts from each of the taxable
years comes from passive investment income.8  That is the
outcome even though the corporation has no taxable income
for the year or years in question.9  IRS has ruled that the
termination may be deemed to be inadvertent if steps are
taken immediately to pay out the accumulated earnings and
profits as a dividend10 but the termination nonetheless
occurs.  If a corporation's Subchapter S election terminates
because the passive income limit is met, the election
terminates for the entire taxable year.11
Meaning of "passive investment income"
The statute states clearly that if "passive investment
income" exceeds 25 percent for the year, the additional tax
is imposed12 and, after three consecutive years of such tax,
the election is terminated.13  The statute defines "passive
investment income" to include
"...gross receipts derived from royalties, rents,
dividends, interest, annuities, and sales or exchanges of
stock or securities...."14
_____________________________________________________
*
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Because of the frequency of land rental on the part of farm
corporations and the magnitude of rental amounts, the
meaning of "rents" has taken on a great deal of significance.
IRS ruled in 1961 that income under a crop share lease
with significant involvement under the lease by someone
acting on behalf of the corporation as lessor was not
considered passive income under the pre-1983 rule.15  That
position was reiterated in a 1989 private letter ruling.16
In late 1994, IRS ruled17 that rent received under even a
cash rent lease was not considered to be passive investment
income where representatives of the corporation visited the
farm every week, consulted with the tenant, maintained and
repaired the buildings and equipment, inspected and
maintained the drainage ditches and tile lines and devoted
several days to helping the tenant during planting and
harvesting seasons.18  The lease had previously been a crop-
share lease but the corporation as lessor had shifted to a
one-year cash rent lease several years earlier.19  The ruling
recites that, after the expiration of the crop share lease, the
corporation sold most of its equipment.  However, the
ruling states —
"...because the new tenant could not afford the farm
help necessary to operate successfully, [the corporate
representatives] became more involved with this
tenant's operations than with those of the former
tenant."20
The outcome was that the cash rent received was not
passive investment income.
Thus, it does not appear that it is absolutely essential to
be bearing the risks of production and the risks of price
change in order to avoid having rents classified as passive
investment income.  It is, however, important to be able to
demonstrate substantial involvement under the lease by
someone on behalf of the S corporation.  A crop share lease
continues to be a notch safer than a cash rent lease,
notwithstanding the 1994 ruling.21
FOOTNOTES
1 I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379.  See generally 7 Harl, Agricultural
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L. Dig. 197 (1990).
3 Id.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
CONTINUOUS USE . The disputed land included 31
acres erroneously included in the plaintiff's land by
surveyors. The plaintiff presented evidence of some use of
the disputed land as pasture and claimed a fence on the
defendant's side of the disputed land was the boundary. The
court held that the plaintiff had not shown sufficient hostile
use to demonstrate adverse possession as a matter of law
because the plaintiff failed to show continuous use of the
disputed land and failed to show that the fence was
adequately maintained to as to completely separate the
disputed land from the defendant's land. Wall v. Carrell,
894 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor filed a motion to
avoid a judgment lien against the debtor's homestead. The
debtor had filed an exemption for the homestead in the
amount of $40,000 although Mont. Code § 70-32-104
allowed only an exemption of $20,000. However, no timely
objections were filed. The court held that for avoidance
purposes, the debtor was limited to the exemption amount
the debtor "could claim;" therefore, the debtor could avoid
judgment liens only to the extent the lien impaired the
$20,000 statutory limit. In re Moe, 179 B.R. 654 (Bankr.
D. Mont. 1995).
HOMESTEAD.  The debtor claimed a homestead
exemption for the debtor's $39,000 of equity in the
homestead. The Chapter 7 trustee objected to the exemption
because there existed $36,000 of pre-homestead claims in
the case. The trustee argued that the trustee had the authority
to object to the exemption under either Section 544(b) or as
a representative of the estate. The court held that Section
544(b) did not apply because there was no transfer by the
debtor to avoid by the trustee; however, the court held that
the trustee did have the authority to object to the exemption
on behalf of the pre-homestead creditors. The court also
held that the debtor could not claim a homestead exemption
except to the extent the equity in the homestead exceeded
the pre-homestead claims filed in the case. In re Rye, 179
B.R. 375 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995).
IRA. The debtor claimed the funds in an IRA as exempt
under N.J. Stat. § 25:2-1. The trustee argued that the IRA
was eligible for the exemption because the IRA funds wee
not rolled over from an ERISA qualified plan and the debtor
had unrestricted access to the funds. The court held that the
IRA was eligible for the exemption because the state
exemption did not require that the funds be derived from an
ERISA qualified plan or that the debtor's access to the funds
be restricted. In re Lamb, 179 B.R. 419 (Bankr. D. N.J.
1994).
    CHAPTER 11   -ALM § 13.03.*
PLAN. The debtor operated a retail garden shop and
nursery. The Chapter 11 plan provided that the debtor would
retain the business property and included the property at its
liquidation value, thus stripping down the secured claims to
the liquidation value. The court held that the property had to
be included at its fair market value because the debtor had
no intention of selling the property and would continue to
receive income from the property. In re Winthrop Old
Farm Nurseries, Inc., 50 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 1995).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
CONVERSION. The Chapter 7 debtor operated an
exotic animal farm in which the debtors raised animals
belonging to other investors in return for a partial ownership
in the animals. The Chapter 7 trustee had filed a motion to
reject the animal raising contracts because of the high
expenses, the declining market for such animals and the
debtors' interference with the trustee's operation of the
business. The debtors then filed a motion to convert the case
to Chapter 12. The debtors argued that they had an absolute
right to convert the case at any time absent fraud. The
debtors' argument was based on the legislative history of
Section 706(a) in which the Senate committee report
referred to the "absolute right" to convert a case. The court
held that a Chapter 7 debtor did not have an absolute right to
convert to Chapter 12 because the statute and legislative
history provided exceptions to the conversion right. The
court also held that conversion would be denied because the
debtors' contracts to raise the animals could be rejected by
the trustee based on the losses incurred by the estate and the
debtors' actions impairing the operation of the business. In
re Starkey, 179 B.R. 687 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ALLOCATION OF PAYMENTS FOR TAXES. The
debtors' business suffered losses from embezzlement by the
